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ABSTRACT
With recent technological advancements, the amount of personal user data that
is being generated is immense. Due to the large volume of data, machine learning
algorithms such as neural networks are serving as the backbone to derive patterns from
this data quickly. This need for big data analytics comes at the cost of the privacy of
user data. The second challenge that must be solved relates to the scalability of the
machine learning algorithm. Neural networks are known to deteriorate as the volume
of the data increases due to complex sum and sigmoid calculations. Therefore in this
thesis, an attempt to parallelize the neural network while also maintaining the privacy
of user data is made. This model would provide a viable option for big data analytics
without sacrificing the privacy of individual users while also maintaining precision
and the classification accuracy of the model. The implementation of the parallelized
privacy preserving neural network will be based on the MapReduce computing model
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1.1 Big Data and Privacy Requirements
As of 2013, 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are created daily. The volumes of data are
vast; the generation speed of data is so fast that the data and information space
has become global. The analysis of the databases that store this data can provide
opportunities to solve major problems in our society like healthcare and others. A
hefty portion of organizations decide not to incorporate the services of big data an-
alytics due to the absence of standard security and privacy protection tools. So es-
sentially, big data specifically refers to those data sets that are so large and complex
that traditional data processing tools and techniques are not sufficiently applicable.
The amount of data that is generated on the internet, social networking, Internet of
Things (IoT) devices, and many other companies, is drastically increasing every day.
Big Data is formally defined as ”The information asset characterized by such a high
volume, velocity, and variety to require specific technology and analytical methods
for its transformation into value.” [15]. Based on this definition, the three properties
most suitable for the term are the 3V’s, also known as, volume, velocity, and variety.
Although these are the three main properties, others complement the features of big
data such as veracity, validity, variability, and vagueness. When the term volume is
related to big data, it refers to the large quantity of data at hand. Velocity is the
measure of how fast the data is coming in. The flow of the information is known
as the velocity vector. The diversity of big data, i.e., they may contain text, audio,
image, video, etc. is signified by variety.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy and security in terms of big data is an important issue. For complex applica-
tions the big data security model is not recommended as it will get disabled by default.
However, without it, data can be breached easily. To understand the difference be-
tween privacy and security, we must understand the context of each term. Privacy
refers to the privilege to have some control over how personal information is collected
and used. Which provides users the capacity to stop information about themselves
from becoming known to people other than those they give information to. One se-
rious issue is the de-identification of personal information during transmission over
the Internet. When we think about security we think about the practice of defending
information and information assets using technology and processes from a wide array
of security aspects such as: unauthorized access, modification, recording, destruction,
disruption, and disclosure. So when comparing both security and privacy we under-
stand that security is fundamental for protecting data, its not sufficient for addressing
privacy. To ensure big data privacy, various tools and techniques have been developed
in the past few years. The tools and techniques have been prepared per the big data
life cycle, i.e., data generation, data storage, and data processing. In the initial phase
of data generation, access restriction and data falsification techniques are used. The
middle stage of data storage relies on encryption techniques. These encryption tech-
niques rely on Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE),
and storage path encryption. In addition, to protect sensitive information, hybrid
clouds are utilized to store the sensitive data on the cloud. The data processing
phase relies on privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP) [15]. Privacy preserving
data publishing consists of anonymization techniques such as generalization and sup-
pression. These techniques can be further coupled to solve classification, clustering,
and association rule mining problems. Classification and clustering techniques tend
to split the input into different groups, while association rule mining techniques find
relationships and trends within the input data. To handle the various measurements
of big data in terms of variety, velocity, and volume, there is a need for efficient and
effective frameworks to process this type of data that tends to come in at extremely
high speeds for a plethora of sources. The scope of our implementation will rely on
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big data privacy preservation in the phase of data processing. This type of model
categorizes the system into a stream, batch, graph, and machine learning process-
ing. Two stages are needed for privacy protection in the data processing phase. The
initial stage will safeguard the data from disclosure due to the possibility of it con-
taining sensitive information. The second stage will consist of extracting meaningful
information from the data without breaking privacy.
1.2 Motivation Behind The Work
Deep learning based off of artificial neural networks has become the backbone for
modeling, classifying and recognizing complex data such as images, speech, and text.
The unparalleled accuracy of these methods has made them the foundation for AI-
based products and services on the internet. Commercial companies that collect user
data on a large scale have become the main beneficiaries of this upcoming technology.
This is largely because the success of deep learning methods is directly proportional
to the amount of data available for training. Companies such as Google, Facebook,
and Apple take advantage of massive amounts of training data collected from their
users and the vast computational power of GPU farms to deploy deep learning on
a large scale. Massive data collection required for deep learning presents obvious
privacy issues. Highly personal user data is kept by large organizations indefinitely.
The users can neither delete it, nor restrict the way the organization chooses to use
it. Images and voice recordings often contain accidentally captured items such as
faces, computer screens, license plates, and the sound of other people talking. This
data is kept and subject to subpoenas and warrants, as well as warrantless spying by
national security and intelligence outfits. Many data owners, such as hospitals, are
unable to share data due to privacy and confidentiality concerns and cannot benefit
from large scale deep learning. Another issue that is not addressed in the literature
is that there are a lack of suitable privacy-preserving machine learning for users that
want to utilize them at a larger scale. Data privacy is also required by law in some
cases, e.g., for medical or financial data. Additionally, the desire of customers and
3
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clients for discretion and privacy is growing and has become a topic of public focus.
1.3 Problem Statement & Outlined Solution
The aim of this research is to attempt to parallelize the neural network while also
maintaining the privacy of the users data. This approach would provide a viable
option for big data analytics without sacrificing the privacy of individual users while
also maintaining the precision and the classification accuracy of the model. The
deployment of the parallelized privacy preserving neural network will be based on
the MapReduce computing model which provides advanced features such as fault
tolerance, data replication, and load balancing.
We tackle the problem with points stated below which we discuss comprehensively
in subsequent chapters of thesis.
• Development of the neural networks will be done using TensorFlow-privacy.
The networks will be optimized using a differentially private stochastic gradient
algorithm which will provide strong privacy guarantees.
• We present three novel neural network architectures to tackle three different
data intensive scenarios.
• The three scenarios tackle situations varying from: large volume of testing data
being present, large volume of training data being present, and a vast number
of neurons being present in the neural network.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
The subsequent chapters of the thesis are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we
present the readers with succinct knowledge which lays a technical foundation for the
rest of the thesis. As for Chapter 3, we present the Literature Survey of related work
done in the area. Chapter 4 explains the implemented Methodology to solve the
problem. Chapter 5 includes the experiment results and analysis of the proposed
4
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solution and comparison with other methods. And lastly, In Chapter 6, we conclude




Overview of Related Technologies
2.1 Privacy Preserving Methods in Big Data
The methods described in this section have been used to provide privacy to a certain
amount but their demerits have also led to the creation of more advance methods and
applications.
2.1.1 Anonymization
Anonymization is one of the most traditional techniques for privacy preserving data
mining, where generalization and suppression techniques are applied in order to pro-
tect an individuals privacy. In generalization, quasi-identifiers are replaced with less
particular but semantically consistent values. Whereas, in suppression techniques
some information is not released at all. However, re-identification is a weakness of
anonymization. To alleviate this threat, the concepts of k-anonymity, l-diversity,
and t-closeness were proposed to enhance traditional techniques for privacy preserv-
ing data mining. When anonymization is transferred to privacy preserving big data
analytics, the risk of re-identification increases so we must ensure that the privacy
preserving algorithms used are efficient. In the next few paragraphs we will explore
the three main anonymization algorithms: k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness.
2.1.1.1 K-Anonymity
K-anonymity is a property of a data set, usually used in order to describe the dataset’s
level of anonymity. A dataset is k-anonymous if every combination of identity-
6
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revealing characterisitics occurs in at least k different rows of the dataset[29]. K-
anonymity is prone to two attacks namely homogeneity attack and the background
knowledge attack. K-anonymity can be applied on patient data as seen in table 2.1.1.
S.No Zip Age Disease
1 57677 29 Cardiac Problem
2 57602 22 Cardiac Problem
3 57678 27 Cardiac Problem
4 57905 43 Skin Allergy
5 57909 52 Cardiac Problem
6 57906 47 Cancer
7 57605 30 Cardiac Problem
8 57673 36 Cancer
9 57607 32 Cancer
Table 2.1.1: Data set before applying K anonymity [3]
K-anonymity algorithm is applied with k value as 3 to ensure 3 indistinguishable
records when an attempt is made to identify a particular person’s data. K-anonymity
is applied on two attributes, Zip and age as seen in Table 2.1.1. The result after
applying K anonymity can be seen in Table 2.1.2. The above technique has utilized
generalization to achieve anonymization. If we were to figure out that John’s age is 27
and he lives in 57677 zip codes then we can conclude that John has a cardiac problem
even after the anonymization as shown in Table 2.1.2. This is called Homogeneity
attack. For example, if John is 36 and it is known that John does not have cancer,
then John definitely must have a Cardiac Problem. K-anonymity can be achieved
by using either generalization or suppression [29]. K-anonymity can be optimized
to prevent data loss by minimizing generalization. Identity disclosure is the major
privacy threat which cannot be guaranteed by K-anonymity.
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S.No Zip Age Disease
1 576** 2* Cardiac Problem
2 576** 2* Cardiac Problem
3 576** 2* Cardiac Problem
4 5790* >40 Skin Allergy
5 5790* >40 Cardiac Problem
6 5790* >40 Cancer
7 576** 3* Cardiac Problem
8 576** 3* Cancer
9 576** 3* Cancer
Table 2.1.2: Data set after applying K anonymity [3]
2.1.1.2 L-Diversity
To address the homogeneity attack that can break K-anonymity, L- diversity was
introduced. As per L-diversity there must be L well represented values for the sensitive
attribute (disease) in each equivalence class [23]. If the variety of the data is large,
it becomes difficult to implement L-diversity. L-diversity has its own weakness in the
form of the skewness attack [23]. When the overall data distribution is skewed into
a few equivalence classes attribute disclosure cannot be ensured. L-diversity is also
prone to the similarity attack[23]. From table 2.1.3 it can be seen that if it is known
that John is 27 years old and lives in the 57677 zip, then John is definitely in the low
income group because the salaries of all the people in the 576** zip is low compared
to others in the table. This is known as the similarity attack.
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Sno Zip Age Salary Disease
1 576** 2* 5k Cardiac Problem
2 576** 2* 6k Cardiac Problem
3 576** 2* 7k Cardiac Problem
4 5790* >40 20k Skin Allergy
5 5790* >40 22k Cardiac Problem
6 5790* >40 24k Cancer
Table 2.1.3: Data set after applying L diversity [3]
2.1.1.3 T-Closeness
Another improvement to L diversity is the T-closeness measure. T- closeness is a
measure where an equivalence class is considered to have ’T-closeness’ if the distance
between the distributions of sensitive attribute in the class is no more than a threshold
and all equivalence classes have T- closeness [19]. T-closeness can be calculated on
every attribute with respect to sensitive attribute. From table 2.1.4 it can be observed
that if we know John is 27 years old, it is still difficult to estimate whether John
has a cardiac problem or not and if he is under the low income group or not. T-
closeness may ensure attribute disclosure but implementing it may not give a proper
distribution of data all the time. Earth Movers Distance metric is used to measure
the distance or closeness between two attributes[19]. The idea of EMD is to imagine
both probability distributions as piles of dirt and calculate the minimum amount of
work needed to reshape the first pile so that it has the same shape as the second [19].
The key attribute of EMD is that it takes distance into account.
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S.No Zip Age Salary Disease
1 576** 2* 5k Cardiac Problem
2 576** 2* 16k Cancer
3 576** 2* 9k Skin Allergy
4 5790* >40 20k Skin Allergy
5 5790* >40 42k Cardiac Problem
6 5790* >40 8k Flu
Table 2.1.4: Data set after applying T closeness [3]
2.1.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMPC) is an important subset of cryptography.
It has the potential to enable real data privacy. SMPC refers to the cryptographic
protocols allowing the distributed computation of a function over inputs that are
distributed without disclosing any information about the inputs [10]. Yao [31] in-
troduced this idea in 1982 with the help of the Millionaire’s problem, which allowed
two parties to determine whose values was larger without disclosing anything about
the individuals values. To get a better understanding, lets use an example: a secret
number that is larger than 1000, a hundred users within a system, and a quorum of 10
users. Each user is given a unique number between 100 and 199. Since the minimum
quorum requirement is 10 users, anytime a group of 10 or more people come together,
their combined numbers, x, will reveal the secret (x > 1000) without revealing any
persons individual number. Protocols based off of secure multi-party computations
tend to be compared to ideal protocols that utilize a trusted third party. A trusted
third party (TTP) is essentially an additional party that all participants fully trust.
These comparisons to a secure multi-party computation protocol become trivial, be-
cause each party can then just send their input to the third party who then sends
the results to each party. The goal of SMPC is to perform these computations and
achieve the security of a TTP protocol without the TTP.
10
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Fig. 2.1.1: Ideal Protocol with 4 Parties [10]
From figure 2.1.1 we observe that there are n parties, denoted as P1, .., Pn having
inputs from x1, ..., xn. There are also a set of publicly known functions f1, ..., fn each
associated with the n inputs. The goal of SMC is that at the end of the protocol,
each participant receives the output for the corresponding function. The security goal
is that each participant should only be aware of their input and the output received
from the function and nothing else. Also, if a set of participants collude with each
other that nothing should be revealed other than what can be inferred.
2.1.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is essentially a very rigorous mathematical definition of privacy.
An algorithm is differentially private if when an algorithm performs some statistical
analysis on a database, after looking at the output of that analysis, one cannot tell if
any user’s data was included in the original dataset or not. Simply put, differential
privacy guarantees that the behaviour of an algorithm will hardly changes when
11
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an individual joins or leaves the dataset [8]. Anything the algorithm might output
on a database containing some individual’s information is almost as likely to have
come from a database without that individual’s information [8]. This guarantee
holds for any individual and any dataset. There are many other privacy measures
that can be used to secure user information. Anonymization is the most commonly
used technique. We have discussed the shortcomings of anonymization techniques.
They tend to be susceptible to threats such as the homogeneity attack, background
knowledge attack, linkage attack, differencing attack, etc. For example, Sweeney
[29] showed that quasi-identifiers such as gender, date of birth, and zip code can be
used to re-identify the majority of American people. Differential privacy provides
mathematical guarantees against these types of attacks. Differential privacy does not
define privacy under a binary notion of data being private or not. Differential privacy
assess privacy as an accumulative risk. Every time a users data is processed it is at
more risk to be exposed. The two parameters used to quantify privacy when working
with differential privacy are (ε, δ). Where ε denotes a metric of privacy loss at a
differential change in data, and δ bounds the probability of an arbitrary change in
the model behaviour.
Fig. 2.1.2: Working of Differential Privacy [15]
In differential privacy, analysts are not allowed to interact with databases con-
taining sensitive user information directly. A piece of software known as the privacy
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guard is introduced between the analyst and the database to help protect privacy.
Figure 2.1.2 can be further explained in 4 steps:
• Step 1 The analyst can query the database through the privacy guard
• Step 2 The privacy guard evaluates the query and other previous queries to
assess the privacy risk.
• Step 3 The privacy guard will then fetch the answer from the database
• Step 4 Some noise will be added to the answer according to the privacy risk
and finally forwarded to the analyst
To finally summarize differential privacy in the form of a definition presented in
[8], a randomized function K gives ε - differential privacy if for all datasets D1 and
D2 differing on at most one element, and for all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≥ exp(∈)× Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
2.2 The Perceptron
The perceptron is the simplest form of a neural network in the form of a linear
classifier used for binary predictions. In order for a perceptron to work, the data
must be linearly separably. It will not converge if the data is nonlinear [26]. A
perceptron takes several binary inputs x1, x2, ..., and produces a single binary output.
13
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Fig. 2.2.1: The Perceptron
From figure 2.2.1, we can see that the perceptron takes in three inputs, x1, x2, x3. It
can have more or fewer inputs. To determine the output, the perceptron model is
dependent on the summation of weights. Weights w1, w2, ..., are real numbers that
express the importance of the respective inputs to the output. Whether the output
of the neuron is, 0 or 1, is determined if the weighted sum, Σjwjxj, is less than or
greater than some threshold value θ [26]. In algebraic terms, the notation can be seen
in equation 1.
output =
0, if Σjwjxj ≤ θ.1, if Σjwjxj > θ. (1)
Equation 1 represents the basic mathematical model for the perceptron algorithm.
Although it is easy to understand we can still simplify the equation by making two
notation changes. The initial change will be to write Σjwjxj as a dot product, w ·
x ≡ Σjwjxj, where w and x represent a vector that consists of the weights and the
inputs[26]. The second change is to move the threshold to the other side of the
inequality and to then replace it by what’s known as the perceptron’s bias, b ≡ −θ
[26]. Using the bias instead of the threshold, the rule can be rewritten:
output =
0, if w · x+ b ≤ θ.1, if w · x+ b > θ. (2)
14
2. OVERVIEW OF RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
In effect, the bias is a measure that will measure how easy it is for the perceptron to
output a 1. Or to put in other terms, it is a measure that measure how easy it is to
get the perceptron to ”fire”. If a perceptron has a large bias value, the perceptron
can easily output a 1, but if the bias is a large negative value, it becomes the difficult
for the perceptron to fire a 1 [26]. Once this value is computed, it is then passed
through an activation function. This function is non-linear and is called the activation
function. The purpose of the activation function is to introduce non-linearity into the
output of the neuron. This is an important aspect since most real world data is non-
linear and we want neurons to learn these non-linear representations. Every activation
function will take a single input and perform a certain fixed mathematical operation
on it.
2.3 Multi-Layer Neural Networks
A Multi-Layer Neural Network contains one or more hidden layers apart from one
input and output layer. While a single layer perceptron can learn only linear functions,
multi-layer neural networks can also learn non-linear functions.
Fig. 2.3.1: Multi-layer Neural Network Architecture
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figure 2.3.1 shows a multi-layer neural network. Here, the units are arranged into
a set of layers, and each layer contains some number of identical units. Every unit
in one layer is connected to every unit in the next layer. The term used to denote
this is ”fully connected”. The first layer is the input layer, and its units take the
values of the input features. The last layer is the output layer, and it has one unit
for each value the network outputs. A single unit is denoted in figure 2.3.1, as this
particular architecture would be used for a regression or binary classification task.
All the layers between these are known as hidden layers. The units within each
layer is known as input units, output units, and hidden units, respectively. The
number of layers is expressed as the depth, and the number of units in each layer is
defined as the width. The basic neural network model can be described as a series of
functional transformations [4]. First we construct M linear combinations [4] of the






ji xi + w
(1)
j0 (3)
Where j = 1, ...,M , and the superscript (1) indicates that the respective parameters
are in the first layer of the neural network[4]. The parameter wji denotes the weights
and wj0 denotes the bias. The quantities aj are known as the activations. Each of
them will be transformed by utilizing a differentiable, non-linear activation function
to give
zj = h(aj). (4)
The nonlinear function h(·) are usually chosen to be the logistic sigmoid function or






kj zj + w
(2)
k0 (5)
where k = 1, ..., K, and K is the total number of outputs. These transformations are
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related to the second layer of the neural network and w
(2)
k0 still corresponds to the
bias values. After this the output units are finally transformed using an appropriate
activation function to give a set of outputs yk. Each output unit is transformed using
a logistic sigmoid function or any other activation function that is suitable according
to the distribution of the data [4]. We denote the logistic sigmoid function below in
equation 6.






In essence, we can combine all the different stages of the entire network that, the






















In equation 8, the weights and bias variables have been combined into a vector
w. So as you can see, the neural network is simply a nonlinear function from a set
of input variables to a set of output variables controlled by a vector of modifiable
parameters [4].
2.4 MapReduce
MapReduce is a programming framework that allows us to perform distributed and
parallel processing on large data sets in a distributed environment [6]. The framework
consists of two distinct tasks - Map and Reduce. In the Map job, the block of data is
read and processed to produce key-value pairs as intermediate outputs. These key-
value pairs are then used as inputs into the Reducer. The Reducer then aggregates
these intermediate data tuples into a smaller set of key-value pairs or tuples to produce
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the final output. The overall MapReduce process can be seen in figure 2.4.1.
Fig. 2.4.1: MapReduce
To get a more in depth understanding, when we split the file into chunks, each one
of them forms the input of a map task. Each map task is assigned to a computer
node called worker, which applies the map function to each key-value pair of the
corresponding input chunk[6]. The intermediate key-value pairs produced are stored
in the local disks of the workers. In order to speed up the algorithm and balancing
the load of workers, each intermediate key-value pair is stored in the local disk into
buckets through a hash function h [6]. Each bucket is assigned to a different worker,
which applies a reduce function specified by the user [6]. There are two important
functions that are included in these three phases, the shuffle and sorting function. The
shuffle function is the process of transferring data from the mappers to the reducers.
In order to speed up the algorithm this function can start even before the map phase
has finished. Shuffle is usually the most cost expensive round. The sorting function
is the process of sorting the series of values with the same key. If zero reducers are




3.1 Privacy Preserving Neural Networks
The introduction of novel machine learning techniques has brought on a technological
revolution. The ability to train a machine to make decisions as a human would brings
a new perspective to what can be achieved. Machine learning benefits fields ranging
from social engineering, image recognition, healthcare services, financial services, etc.
The quality of the output of a machine learning algorithm is directly proportional
to the size and quality of the dataset that its trained on. Since data collection is a
scattered process, a lot of effort is required to collect them. Users tend to reluctantly
submit their data to third-party collectors. To convince users that their data is
secure and private, an approach to train the machine learning algorithms in a privacy
preserving way must be utilized. For this fundamental techniques such as encryption,
differential privacy, and other miscellaneous approaches can be used. When these
techniques are utilized on the data and then used to train a neural network we can
say that the neural network has satisfied a privacy preserving constraint. The scientific
term that is used to identify neural networks trained on encrypted data is CryptoNets.
Other ways to create privacy preserving neural networks include differential privacy,





ML Confidential [11] which was developed by Graepel et. al., is a convolutional neu-
ral network that works on a homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme. Instead of the
nonlinear activation function they use a polynomial based approximation method.
They assume a cloud service based scenario, and ensure privacy during the transfer
period of the data from client and server. A public and private key is generated for
each client in the key generation phase [11]. Client data will be encrypted using ho-
momorphic encryption during the data transfer period to the server[11]. The training
of the model will be done using the encrypted data on the cloud and then use the
training model to classify the test dataset [11].
Another approach to creating cryptonets would be through using a low latency
framework like Gazelle, proposed by [17], they combine HE with garbled circuits to
create a privacy preserving Prediction as a Service (PaaS) environment. The authors
utilize Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) to improve the encryption speed of
the homomorphic encryption process [17]. The goal of Gazelle is to allow the client
to do the classification process without revealing the input to the server and also
preserve the privacy of the model in the server[17]. To preserve the privacy of the
convolutional neural network the authors hide the weight, stride size, and bias in the
convolutional layers[17]. They go on to show that Gazelle completely outperforms
the cryptonets [7] proposed by Gilad-Bachrach et al., and MiniONN [20] in terms of
runtime.
The cryptonets [7] proposed by Gilad-Bachrach et al. infuses homomorphic en-
cryption in to the convolutional neural network. They show that cloud services can
apply encrypted predictions on encrypted training data, and then return the en-
crypted prediction to the client[7]. The client can then decrypt the prediction using
their own private key[7]. This implementation would be very useful to hospitals in
particular. The major disadvantage that this method presents is that with increase
in the number of non-linear layers the performance is limited. The error rate tends
to increase and the accuracy drops with deeper neural networks.
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We will now further evaluate on MiniONN proposed by [20]. MiniONN is a frame-
work that converts neural networks into oblivious neural networks. The conversion
results in accuracy loss due to the transformations of nonlinear functions. Two obliv-
ious transformations are provided for the piecewise linear activation function and for
the smooth activation function [20]. A smooth functions can be changed into a con-
tinuous polynomial by parting the function into a few sections. At that point, for each
part, polynomial estimation is utilized for the estimation, bringing about a piecewise
linear function. MiniONN supports any activation function that has a monotonic
range, piecewise polynomial, or can be approximated into polynomial functions[20].
SecureML, proposed by [24] is a method that leverages secure multi-party compu-
tation for privacy preserving deep learning. It utilizes Oblivious Transfer (OT), Yao’s
Garbled Circuits, and Secret Sharing [24]. They utilize linear and logistic regression
in a deep learning environment. They propose an addition and multiplication algo-
rithm for values that are secretly shared in linear regression. Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) is used to calculate the optimum value of regression [24]. The main
weakness of this scheme is that its optimal for simple neural networks only. This
results in a very low accuracy.
3.1.2 Miscellaneous Approaches
The authors in [2] propose three machine learning models that consist of the com-
bination of Kernel Learning mode and Deep Neural Networks to lead to a novel
Multi-Kernel Learning and Hybrid Learning model to help better preserve privacy in
big data. The authors try to address the issue of privacy preserving machine learning
via utility maximizing lossy compression of data. The authors proposed models try
to give users access to only information necessary for the intended use, but nothing
else [2]. For this the authors focus on kernel learning which is efficient in learning
low-dimensional data and privacy – preserving utility cases, and the second candi-
date the authors focus on is deep learning. Deep learning will allow the effective
extraction of utility information from numerous feature representations else [2]. The
authors state that to the best of their knowledge they are first to propose this model
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of Multi-Kernel Learning and Hybrid Learning. Neural Network Architecture Before
kernel selection for the neural network is done, kernel-based compression is done as
it has shown to be effective in utility- maximizing lossy compression. Kernel-based
compression is done to obtain the dimensional projections from each kernel induced
vector space. There are two reasons for this, if the class is normally distributed after
mapping with the covariance then the projections are known to be optimal. Second,
these observations will capture the maximum mutual information between the obser-
vations and the utility subspace spanned by the class centers [2]. Because different
kernels provide different classification performances for a given task the authors per-
form a filtering process based on discriminant information metric. The discriminant
information metric measures the mutual information between the mapping and the
label. If a mapping has a low DI score it is removed. This will reduce the amount
of information and regularize the learning space allowing the DNN to learn more ef-
fectively [2]. A direct effect would be seen by an increase in classification accuracy.
Due to the reduction in information privacy preservation would also improve [2]. DI
metric is directly proportional to predictive accuracy. A fully-connected feed-forward
neural network with Rectified Linear Units (ReLU). Non-linear feature mappings will
occur up until the narrow layer, which will then be project on to the subspace. The
mappings are learnt by the neural network together with the projection [2]. In the
hybrid model, the input layer of the DNN will consist of multi-kernel features. The
rest will be a regular feed forward neural network. This separation between the fea-
tures and the DNN gives us the separation between public and private spheres [2].
Now for the compressive hybrid model, the multi-kernel features will again be the
input to the DNN. The hybrid model will include a narrow funneling layer which will
ensure the separation between public and private spheres. The hybrid model provides
the best privacy preservation among all the competing models [2].
Shokri et. al design, implement, and evaluate a system that allows numerous
parties to learn simultaneously using an accurate neural network model without the
sharing of their respective input datasets [27]. The authors parallelize and execute the
stochastic gradient descent optimization algorithm asynchronously, while also allow-
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ing each party to train their input dataset independently. This minimizes the sharing
of the models’ key parameters. The users’ preserve the privacy of their respective data
and still benefit from the models of other users. This will boost learning accuracy
beyond what they would achieve if a single dataset was used [27]. The authors state
that they are the first to implement this to the best of their knowledge. No previous
work has addressed the problem of collaborative deep learning with multiple partici-
pants using distributed stochastic gradient descent [27]. The aim of deep learning is
to extract complex features from high dimensional data and utilize those features to
build a model to produce an output. Neural networks that are used in deep learn-
ing are usually multi-layered networks so more abstract features can be computed as
nonlinear functions of lower level features. Usually, in a multi-layer neural network,
each neuron will receive the output of the neurons from the previous layer along with
a bias signal. The core protocol of the author’s approach is a Selective Stochastic
Gradient Descent protocol. During this protocol certain parameters contribute more
to a neural networks objective function and so these parameters undergo much bigger
updates during a particular iteration of training. In Selective SGD the user selects
approximately half of the parameters to be updated at each iteration. These can be
selected at random or by selecting those parameters whose values are farthest from
the local optima (larger gradient) [27]. The distributed selective SGD assumes that
two or more participants are training independently and at the same time. Partici-
pants will asynchronously share the gradients they individually computed with each
other. Each participant has full control on what they can share [27]. The sharing of
the gradients can be done directly, through a trusted central server, or through secure
multi-party computations [27]. The overall architecture of the proposed system can
be seen above. It is assumed that there are N participants and each has their own
local private dataset for training. The existence of a parameter server is assumed in
this proposed system [27]. Initialization of the parameters is done by each individual
and these parameters can be uploaded to the parameter server using a parameter
exchange protocol [27]. The parameters can be accessed by each participant through
this server. Now each participant can begin training using the stochastic gradient
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descent algorithm. The distributed selective stochastic gradient descent algorithm
(DSSGD) is independently run by the participants during each iteration [27]. The
steps of the DSSGD are shown below: Choose initial parameters and learning rate.
• Step 1: Download the parameters from the server and replace the corresponding
local parameters.
• Step 2: Run Stochastic Gradient Descent on the local dataset and the local
parameters should be updates according to step 1.
• Step 3: The gradient vector is computed, which is the vector of changes in all
local parameters due to SGD.
• Step 4: Upload the gradient vector to the parameter server.
The authors in [12] approach the problem of privacy-preservation in neural net-
works from a different perspective.They couple incremental learning and genetic al-
gorithms to achieve privacy preservation in neural networks. They go on to present
that their method allows to obtain an accurate model based on information in dis-
tributed databases without any information sharing during the training process with-
out degrading the classification accuracy. This approach allows to construct a global
classifier based on the horizontal partitioning of the data. The main characteristic
of the work done by [12] is that the distributed learning is done without exchanging
any pattern between the different operations hence preserving privacy. Local models
are built in accordance to the number of data partitions. Once each local classifiers
are trained they send the results to a central entity. At this central entity, a genetic
algorithm is used to build a more accurate final model taking advantage of the in-
cremental learning capacity [12]. This global model is then sent to each entity for
classification of new data. The authors evaluated their proposed approach using six
classification problems: shuttle, letter, adult, nursery, waveform and mushroom [12].
The proposed model in [12] was compared with the Naive-Bayes, Tree-Augmented
Naive-Bayes (TAN), C4.5, and with the artificial neural network. These were used a
local classifiers on each node.
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3.1.3 Trusted Hardware Components and Trusted Execution
Environments
Software Guard Extensions, that are featured in Intel processors starting with Sky-
lake, provide safe areas (enclaves) that protect code and data from every other soft-
ware on the platform. This includes privileged software such as the operating system
and hypervisor. Any code running in an enclave can operate on sensitive data with-
out the fear of accidental exposure of the data on the platform. The privacy and
integrity of the enclave is supported by the hardware. We can observe Chiron, pro-
posed by the authors in[14] which is a system for privacy preserving machine learning
as a service. Chiron conceals the training data from the service operator and also
hides the training algorithm and model structure[14]. Although its immplemented
on Intel SGX enclaves, it relies on other principles to achieve dual data privacy and
model confidentiality[14]. Chiron will run the standard machine learning process in
the enclave. A Ryoan sandbox is utilized to prevent the model from leaking training
data to the service operator[14]. With the help of a parameter server, Chiron is able
to achieve distributed training as model parameters can be shared within the enclave.
3.2 Approaches to Scale Neural Networks
In this section we will see the current work implemented in parallelization of neural
networks through MapReduce. When we think about the traditional machine learning
algorithms, we usually separate them according to their differences. The authors in [5]
show that most of the traditional machine learning algorithms fit a Statistical Query
Model (SQM) and they can be conveyed in a certain ”summation form” which enables
them to be easily parallelized on multicore componenents. A variety of learning
algorithms that are covered in [5] include locally weighted linear regression, k-means,
logisitic regression, naive Bayes, SVM, ICA, PCA, guassian dicriminant analysis, EM,
and backpropagated Neural Networks. The neural networks will be our main focus
as that is the core area we plan to expand our work on. For multicore systems,
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concurrent applications benefit the most due to little communication between the
cores [5]. According to [5] the Statistical Query Model permits a learning algorithm to
access the learning problem only through a statistical query oracle. Suppose we have
a function f(x, y) over instances, the statistical query oracle returns an estimate of
the expectation of f(x, y), essentially and average over the training/test distribution.
So any algorithm that calculation statistics or gradients can fit this model sinces
these computations can be batched and expressed as a sum over data points. When
the algorithm does calculations, these calculations can be divided over the multiple
cores. A division of the data set into as many pieces as there are cores is done.
Each core is given its share of the data to sum the equations over, and the results of
the all the cores are then aggregated in the form of the algorithm called ”summation
form”. The architecture that is proposed in [5] is largely inspired from the MapReduce
architecture proposed in the original paper [6]. The data is then cached for subsequent
MapReduce calls. Every algorithm will have its own instance, and each MapReduce
task will be assigned to its engine [5]. Similar to the MapReduce engine proposed
in [6], this engine will also have a master node which helps coordinates the mappers
and the reducers. The masters job consists of assigning the split data to different
mappers and then collects the intermediate data from the mappers. After this data is
collected, the master node will then delegate the data to the reduce to process it and
return the final results. The parallel implementation of the neural network model will
focus on the backpropagation process [5]. The network structure defined allows each
mapper to propagate its set of data through the neural network. For each training
example, the error is backpropagated and a partial gradient is calculated for each
of the weights in the network [5]. The reducer then sums all the partial gradients
from each mapper and performs a batch gradient descent to update all the weights
in the network [5]. The authors experimentation phase consisted of each algorithm
running on the MapReduce framework and the other being a serial implementation
without the framework. The experiments were performed on 8 machine learning data
sets from the UCI Machine Learning repository and two others from research groups.
In [22], Long and Gupta presented a scalable parallel artificial neural network using
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MPI (Message Passing Interface) for parallelization.It is worth noting that MPI was
designed for data intensive applications with high performance requirements. MPI
provides little support in fault tolerance. If any fault happens, an MPI computation
has to be started from the beginning. As a result, MPI is not suitable for big data
applications, which would normally run for many hours during which some faults
might happen. Sun et. al [28] implement a deep learning algorithm to train the
input data, where a MapReduce programming model is made use of to parallelize
the computation. They utilize a cloud computing hadoop cluster. The progress of
their machine learning algorithm takes place in three steps [28]. First, the step of
pre-training which makes use of deep learning technology to initialize weights, the
step to fine-tune the weights, and the last step aiming at improving the precision.
The motivation for adding a pre-training step is to counter act the inefficiency of back
propagation when converting high-dimensional data into low-dimensional data. They
utilize restricted Boltzmann machine for this. In the fine-tuning step, the algorithm
will train the pre-trained weights using back-propagation to get a precise value for
the weights. In the last step Adaboosting is utilized to refine the result of the data
training. For testing their algorithm, the authors in [28] utilize the MNIST dataset
and the AWS cloud computing platform with multiple EC2 instances. From the
overall evaluations the authors result prove that MapReduce has an excellent speed-
up performance and that high classification accuracy can also be achieved once the




To tackle the problem statement, we propose three architectures that when coupled
with a differentially private algorithm to help preserve privacy and to deal with dif-
ferent types of data-intensive scenarios. The initial situation that we aim to address
is in which there is a large volume of testing data to be classified. In this scenario,
each mapper builds the same differentially private neural network classifier using the
same set of training data and a portion of the testing data. The second data-intensive
scenario focuses on the volume of the training data being very large. In this case,
the training data is segmented into data chunks which are processed by mappers in
parallel. Each mapper still builds the same differentially private neural network but
uses only a portion of the training dataset to train. An ensemble technique known as
bootstrapping will be used to maintain accuracy. The third scenario targets a situa-
tion in which the number of neurons in the neural network is significant. In this case,
the third model parallelizes and distributes the neural network among the mappers
in such a way that each mapper utilizes a portion of the neurons for training. The
neural networks will be implemented using TensorFlow-private enforcing differential
privacy, ensuring that the data will remain private. The infrastructure will be created
with the help of AWS EMR instances. The Hadoop cluster will consist of 5 nodes,
in which four will be Datanodes, and the remaining one will be a Namenode. The















Table 4.0.1: Hadoop Specifications
4.1 Privacy-Preserving MapReduce Differentially
Private Neural Network 1
As previously stated the initial architecture proposed will be dealing with a situation
in which there is a large volume of testing data to be classified. Consider a testing
dataset that is segmented across mappers qi = r1, r2, r3, ..., rin, qi ∈ Q, where
1. qi denotes an instance;
2. Q denotes a dataset;
3. in denotes the length of qi; it is also used to determine the number of inputs to
the neural network;
4. the inputs are enclosed in the format of 〈instancek, targetk, type〉;
5. instancek represents qi, which is the input to the neural network;
6. targetk represents the desired output in instancek is a training instance.
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7. type consist of two values ”train” or ”test”, which will be marked by instancek,
if the value is ”test” the targetk field will be empty.
The files that contain the instance are stored and saved into the Hadoop Distributed
File System (HDFS) first. Each file will consist of the entire training data and a
portion of the testing data. The number of files will determine the number of mappers
to be utilized. In the initialization phase, each mapper will initialize a neural network.
Hence, there will be n differentially private neural networks in the cluster. All the
neural networks will follow the same structure and parameters. The mappers will read
the data in the form of 〈instancek, targetk, type〉 from the files and parses the data
files. If the type field consists of the ”train” value then that instance will be the input
in the neural network. The output of each of the layers is computed within the neural
network until the output layer generates the final output indicating the end of the
feed forward process. The neural networks on each mapper will then begin the back
propagation process. The weights and biases for each neuron will be updated. This
process is repeated until all the instances that are labelled as ”train” are processed
and the error is satisfied.
Each mapper will now begin classifying all instances labelled as ”test” by running
the feed forward process. Since each mapper only classifies a portion of the test set,
efficiency has increased. After that every mapper outputs an intermediate key value
pair in the form of 〈instancek, ojm〉, where instancek is the key and ojm is the output
of the mth mapper. The reducer then collects and merges the outputs the results into
the Hadoop Distributed File System. The architecture can be seen in figure 4.1.1.
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Fig. 4.1.1: Privacy-preserving Model 1 [21]
4.2 Privacy-Preserving MapReduce Differentially
Private Neural Network 2
The second scenario focuses on when the training data to be processed is significantly
large. In this situation, the training data is divided into chunks. Each of these data
chunks is fed as an input to the mappers. The criteria to determine the number
of mappers is dependent on the number of data chunks generated. So, each neural
network on the mappers will produce an independent classifier based on the training
parameters. The neural networks are trained using only a portion of the training data
to help reduce the computation overhead. A major issue is that the classification
accuracy of each neural network will degrade as it is trained on only a portion of
the training data. To solve this an ensemble technique such as bootstrapping is
utilized to convert numerous weak learners into a number of strong learners. To give
a brief overview, bootstrapping is a statistical re-sampling technique used to estimate
statistics on a population by sampling a dataset with replacement. In the initial
step of this algorithm balanced bootstrapping is performed to generate a number of
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subsets which will then be saved as individual files in the Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS). When the algorithm starts each mapper constructs one differentially
private neural network where the weights and biases are initialized in a range from
-1 to 1. The first record is then input into the neural network from the input file.
The mapper first parses the data and finds the instance type. If the instance type
is ”train” the data is fed into the classifier. Each neuron in the different layers will
then compute their outputs and generate the final output indicating the end of the
feed-forward process. The back-propagation process will then begin and the weights
and bias values will be computed and updated accordingly. The training process will
continue until all the training instances are run through. Now the all the instances of
type ”test” will be fed into the classifier for classification. The mappers will produce
the final classification results in the format of 〈instancek, ojm〉. In the last step, the
reducer will collect all the intermediate outputs. The outputs with the same key
will then be merged together. The reducer will then perform the majority voting
operation and output the final results into the Hadoop Distributed File System. The
architecture for the second algorithm can be seen in figure 4.1.2
Fig. 4.2.1: Privacy-preserving Model 2[21]
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4.3 Privacy-Preserving MapReduce Differentially
Private Neural Network 3
The third privacy-preserving algorithm aims to accommodate a significantly large
neural network on one MapReduce cluster. Hence, each mapper will be responsible
for holding many neurons. Many iterations take place in the algorithm containing
n layers. There will be n − 1 MapReduce tasks to implement the algorithm. The
feed-forward process in this algorithm will run for n − 1 iterations, while the back-
propagation process takes place in the last iteration. A data format in the form
of 〈reducerm, instancen, wij, θj, targetn, (w2ij, θ2j , ..., wn−1ij , θn−1j )〉 is used to guarantee
that data passes from mapper to reducer in an efficient flow. Here reducerm represents
the mth reducer and instancen represents the n
th training or testing instance from
the dataset. The weights and biases are represented by Wij and θj. Unlike our
previous two models, in this model the parameters are not initialized at startup,
they are saved in one file on the Hadoop Distributed File System. When the initial
computation begins, the mappers will compute the neurons output and publish in
the format of 〈reducerm, xj, (w2ij, θ2j , ..., wn−1ij , θn−1j ), targetn〉, where xj is the output
of the neuron. The first parameter will guarantee that the mth reducer will collect the
output, maintaining the structure of the network. In this initial phase the weights and
biases will be set to values between -1 to 1. This reducer then produces m outputs.
The reducerm′ output indicates to the m
′th mapper to start processing the output
files. These output files are the input files for the next layer in the network. This
process continues where the mappers compute the neurons outputs and adjusting
the values of the weights and biases accordingly. The process continues until the
end of the feed forward process. The last round of back-propagation starts by the
mappers processing 〈reducerm′ , xj, (wn−1ij , θn−1j ), targetn〉, computing the output of
neurons, and publishing the results in the form of 〈xj, targetn〉. One reducer will
then collect the outputs in the form of 〈xj1, xj2, xj3, ..., xjk, targetn〉. The reducer
will then begin the back-propagation process and compute new weights and biases
for each layer. The previous input files containing the weights, biases, and outputs
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are retrieved and updated with the new values. The new values are updated in
the 〈reducerm, instancen, wij, θj, targetn, (w2ij, θ2j , ..., wn−1ij , θn−1j )〉 format. The second
instance will be read by the reducer in the way of 〈instancen+1, targetn+1〉 since
instancen+1 and targetn+1 represent the updated values. The training process will
continue until all instances are processed and the error has been satisfied. During
classification, only the feed-forward process will be run and the reducer will publish
in the same format as the previous two models. The architecture for this model can
be seen in figure 4.3.1.
Fig. 4.3.1: Privacy-preserving Model 3 [21]
4.4 Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient De-
scent
Before we discuss the working of the differentially private stochastic gradient descent,
lets look at the working of the traditional stochastic gradient descent. Stochastic
gradient descent is an iterative process. During each iteration a random batch of
data is sampled from the training set. The error is then calculated between the
model prediction and the training label. The error which is also known as the loss is
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then differentiate with respect to the model parameters. These derivatives allow us to
see which model parameters to tweak in order to reduce the error. This will help the
model come closer to predicting the correct label. Iteratively computing the gradients
and applying them to update model parameters is known as descent. To ensure that
traditional stochastic gradient descent is differentially private two modifications are
needed. Foremost, the sensitivity of each gradient must be bounded. In simpler words,
there is a need to limit the amount of influence an individual training point can have
on a gradient computation. To solve this, the gradient is clipped on each training
point that it is computed on. This way it allows to bound how much each training
point can influence the model parameters. Second, we must randomize the algorithms
behaviour to make it statistically impossible to know whether or not any data point
was included in the training set by comparing the updates SGD utilizes when it
operates with or without the particular point in the training set. This is achieved
by sampling random noise and adding it to the clipped gradient. The algorithm,
proposed by [1] can be seen in figure 4.4.1.
Fig. 4.4.1: Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent [1]
35
4. METHODOLOGY
4.5 Neural Network Architecture
The architecture of the neural network that is used in our algorithm can be seen in
table 4.5.1.
Layers Filter Pool Size Units Kernel Size Strides Padding Activation Function
Convolutional 16 - - 8 2 same RELU
Max Pooling - 2 - - 1 - -
Convolutional 32 - - 4 2 valid RELU
Max Pooling - 2 - - 1 - -
Flatten Layer - - - - - - -
Dense Layer - - 32 - - - RELU
Dense Layer - - 10 - - - SOFTMAX
Table 4.5.1: Neural Network Architecture
4.6 Datasets
The two datasets that have been utilized are the MNIST and a synthetic dataset that
was generated. MNIST is a collection of images that represent handwritten digits.
The MNIST dataset consists of a total of 70,000 images. Each image is 28 pixels
in width and 28 pixels in height, for a total of 784 pixels. The images are divided
in 10 different classes representing numbers from 0 to 9. The synthetic dataset that
we have created consists of 8 million values. The dataset consists of 12 features and
there are 3 different classes.
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Experimental Results & Analysis
Based on the methodology discussed we develop the system and test it various sce-
narios and derive the analysis of the results. The implementation of the three privacy
preserving algorithms was done using Hadoop, an open source implementation frame-
work of the MapReduce computing model. The Hadoop cluster was built on amazon
web services using Elastic MapReduce instances.
5.1 Scalability Analysis
Several experiments were carried out to measure the scalability of the algorithms
using the MNIST and synthetic dataset. Figure 5.1.1 is showing the computational
efficiency of the first privacy-preserving algorithm. From the graph, we can observe
the computational efficiency of a stand-alone neural network and the first proposed
privacy-preserving algorithm. Initially, our privacy-preserving algorithm behaves sim-
ilarly to the independent neural network. As the volume of the data increases, it
becomes evident that our privacy-preserving algorithm outperforms the independent
neural network. This is mainly due to the distribution of the testing data on the
mappers and the data nodes. Now figure 5.1.2 which shows the computational effi-
ciency of our second privacy-preserving algorithm. From the figure, we can see that
even from the start, the second proposed algorithm slightly beats the stand-alone
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Fig. 5.1.1: Scalability for PPMRDPNN 1
Fig. 5.1.2: Scalability for PPMRDPNN 2
neural network and moves on to ultimately outperform the independent neural net-
work and PPMRDPNN 1. Similar to PPMRDPNN 1 algorithm, PPMRDPNN 2 also
38
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS
scales well with growth in the data.
Fig. 5.1.3: Scalability for PPMRDPNN 3
Figure 5.1.3 shows the computation overhead incurred by the third privacy-preserving
algorithm. We can observe that the algorithm scales similarly to the independent
neural network, although it’s still faster. The third privacy-preserving algorithm
incurs higher overhead than our previous two proposed algorithms PPMRDPNN 1
and PPMRDPNN 2. This is because the map and reduce tasks are performed in
one scheduled job in our last two algorithms while our third privacy-preserving al-
gorithm performs many other duties causing the mappers and reducers to start and
stop multiple times continuously. Although PPMRDPNN 3 does not scale as well
as PPMRDPNN 1 and PPMRDPNN 2, it still performs better than the independent
neural network as the dataset grows larger. From the analysis of the three graphs
presented we can see that in terms of scalability, PPMRDPNN 1 and PPMRDPNN 2
would be the most efficient out of the proposed privacy-preserving algorithms. In the
next section we will discuss the performance analysis of all three privacy-preserving
algorithms.
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5.2 Performance Analysis
The performance of all three privacy-preserving algorithms is measured as a function
of the privacy budget, ε. The algorithms are tested using three different levels of
the privacy budget. Each dataset was tested on the model under conditions where
the noise multiplier was changing to gauge a better understanding of the tradeoff
between accuracy and privacy. The increase in value of the noise multiplier is directly
proportional to the increase in security of the data. The levels range from low noise,
medium noise, and high noise. When the privacy budget ε is small, it signifies higher
privacy guarantees but lower accuracy. When the privacy budget ε is higher, it
means lower privacy guarantees but higher accuracy. The closer the value of ε is to
zero indicates a higher level of security. In this section, we observe the performance
analysis and find an optimal tradeoff between the privacy budget ε and accuracy.
5.2.1 PPMRDPNN 1 Analysis
In this section, we will observe the performance for the first privacy preserving al-
gorithm, PPMRDPNN 1. The privacy budget, ε is set at 8.01 to indicate low noise
injection. So, from Figure 5.2.1 (a), it can be observed that as the algorithm continues
to train on the MNIST dataset, the accuracy reaches to 99%. Now this is possible
since the noise injected into the data is fairly low.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.1: PPMRDPNN 1 Low Noise
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The model is trained using 32 mappers for 60 epochs on the MNIST dataset and for
900 epochs on the synthetic dataset. Each of the 32 mappers gets an entire portion of
the training set and 1 of 32 splits of the test data. Each mapper would classify 1,250
instances for the MNIST dataset and 165,000 instances for the synthetic dataset.
By observing Figure 5.2.1(b), we can see that the training process is rougher than
the training process on the MNIST dataset. This is due to a few reasons, such as
the quality of the dataset. The MNIST dataset is much more refined than our syn-
thetic dataset. Also, we must consider that each mapper is training on more values
using synthetic dataset, which would result in more fluctuations. Regardless, PPM-
RDPNN 1 still achieves the same accuracy of 99% since there is low noise injection.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.2: PPMRDPNN 1 Medium Noise
From figure 5.2.2, we can observe the performance of PPMRDPNN 1 when a medium
amount of noise is injected into the data. The privacy budget ε is equal to 3.01 in this
case. The same measures as previous are used to evaluate the model when medium
noise is injected. We can observe that with the increase in noise our model achieved
97.5% on the MNIST dataset and 96.6% on the synthetic dataset. It can also be seen
that the curve for training is smoother for the MNIST dataset than our synthetic
dataset due to reasons we have already discussed. It can also be seen to achieve a
lower privacy budget our model is trained for less epochs on both datasets. This time
we train for 45 epochs on the MNIST dataset and 800 epochs on the synthetic dataset
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allowing the model fewer epochs to query the noisy data when training resulting in
a lower privacy budget. Although there is a minor drop in accuracy, the increase in
security allows the model to be an positive choice for privacy preserving deep learning.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.3: PPMRDPNN 1 High Noise
The graphs in figure 5.2.3 show the performance of PPMRDPNN 1 under the condi-
tions when high noise is injected into the system. The privacy budget ε is equal to
1.13 making it as close to industry standard as possible. We train the neural network
for even fewer epochs this time. We train the model for 15 epochs on the MNIST
dataset and for 700 epochs on the synthetic dataset. There is a significant drop in
accuracy in comparison to when ε = 8.01 and ε = 3.01. When we inject high noise
we obtain an accuracy of 95.5% for the MNIST dataset and 91% for the synthetic
dataset. Although the accuracy for the MNIST dataset is not bad, the accuracy drop
for the synthetic dataset indicates that for larger datasets the accuracy could be below
expectations. Looking at the overall results regarding the scalability of the algorithm
and the privacy - accuracy tradeoff, PPMRDPNN 1 has proven to be an optimistic
model for large scale privacy preserving deep learning. Table 5.2.1 shows the overall
results of the model for the MNIST dataset can be seen along with other parameters
used to train the model. Table 5.2.2 shows the overall results and parameters for the
synthetic dataset.
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Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 1.3 256 15 1.13 95.5%
0.25 1.0 256 45 3.01 97.5%
0.25 0.7 256 60 8.01 99.0%
Table 5.2.1: PPMRDPNN 1 MNIST Overall Results
Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 7 33,360 700 1.13 91%
0.25 6.6 33,360 800 3.01 96.6%
0.25 5.9 33,360 900 8.01 99.0%
Table 5.2.2: PPMRDPNN 1 Synthetic Data Overall Results
After analyzing both tables we can come to the conclusion that an optimal tradeoff
between privacy and accuracy can be achieved while distributing the computation of
the neural network.
5.2.2 PPMRDPNN 2 Analysis
To evaluate PPMRDPNN 2, we use the same two datasets, where the mappers are
trained by subsets of the training data and produced classification results of the
testing instances based on bootstrapping and majority voting. Figure 5.2.4 presents
the accuracy results of the PPMRDPNN 2 on the two datasets when low noise is
injected. It shows that with an increase in the number of training epochs in each sub
neural network, the accuracy based on majority voting continues to increase. In the
scenario of low noise injection, PPMRDPNN 2 achieves an accuracy of 98.7% on the
MNIST data set when trained for 60 epochs. An accuracy of 99% is produced on the
synthetic dataset when trained for 900 epochs. When we compare the accuracy curve
of both datasets to the PPMRDPNN 1 low noise results, we see that the curve is
smoother for the PPMRDPNN 2 algorithm. This indicates that the PPMRDPNN 2
model shows higher stability. The privacy budget for low noise injection remains the
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(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.4: PPMRDPNN 2 Low Noise
same at ε = 8.01. This time 18 mappers are used with each mapper classifying 1100
instances for the MNIST dataset and 147,000 instances for the synthetic dataset. We
can observe the performance results for PPMRDPNN 2 with medium noise injection
in figure 5.2.5.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.5: PPMRDPNN 2 Medium Noise
The PPMRDPNN 2 model is able to achieve an accuracy of 95.5% on the MNIST
dataset when the privacy budget ε = 3.01 and an accuracy of 98% on the synthetic
dataset. To achieve an accuracy this high with medium level noise injection proves
that this model is better than our previous PPMRDPNN 1 algorithm. The smooth
learning curve further proves our hypothesis of PPMRDPNN 2 being more stable
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than PPMRDPNN 1. The model starts off slowly with a low accuracy for both
datasets and then proceeds to increase drastically with increase in training. Hence,
the bootstrapping algorithm and majority voting maintain the classification accuracy
even though the mappers are training on segmented datasets. Figure 5.2.6 presents
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.6: PPMRDPNN 2 High Noise
the accuracy under high noise injection. The accuracy drop is minimal for the MNIST
dataset under high noise injection as an accuracy of 94.5% is still achieved. Although,
we see a significant drop in accuracy from 98% to 93% for the synthetics dataset. This
is due to the dataset being significantly larger than the MNIST dataset meaning at
higher noise injection it becomes to difficult for the model to extract meaningful pat-
terns. The privacy budget ε = 1.13 shows that a high amount of noise was introduced
into the system and our algorithm still produces optimistic results. Evaluating Table
5.2.3 and 5.2.4 we can see that with medium noise injection an optimal tradeoff can
be achieved and our second privacy preserving algorithm is a viable solution for large
scale privacy preserving deep learning.
Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 1.3 256 15 1.13 94.5%
0.25 1.0 256 45 3.01 95.5%
0.25 0.7 256 60 8.01 98.7%
Table 5.2.3: PPMRDPNN 2 MNIST Overall Results
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Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 7 33,360 700 1.13 93.0%
0.25 6.6 33,360 800 3.01 98.0%
0.25 5.9 33,360 900 8.01 99.0%
Table 5.2.4: PPMRDPNN 2 Synthetic Data Overall Results
5.2.3 PPMRDPNN 3 Analysis
PPMRDPNN 3 executes an entirely parallel and circulated neural network utilizing
Hadoop to manage a complex network with many neurons. Figure 5.2.7 presents the
results of our third proposed method with low noise injection. From observing the
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.7: PPMRDPNN 3 Low Noise
figure we can see that the PPMRDPNN 3 trains smoothly on the MNIST dataset but
fluctuations can be observed in the training of the synthetic dataset. We utilize 32
mappers in the implementation of this algorithm. In comparison with our previous
two algorithms, PPMRDPNN 3 produces a lower accuracy when there is low noise
injection. An accuracy of 98.5% and 95.6% is achieved for the MNIST and synthetic
dataset. As seen in the other algorithms, the accuracy continues to increase as it is
trained on more instances. The privacy budget ε is the same for all low noise injection
scenarios at 8.01. The accuracy obtained is respectable but its not comparable to the
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accuracy achieved by PPMRDPNN 1 and PPMRDPNN 2.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.8: PPMRDPNN 3 Medium Noise
When we observe the results obtain by PPMRDPNN 3 in the case of medium noise
injection, we can notice the fluctuation in the accuracy curve for both datasets. We
see an accuracy of 97.3% and 92% achieved for the MNIST and synthetic datasets.
The accuracy achieved for the MNIST dataset is respectable with the privacy budget
being 3.01. Regardless, the accuracy obtained for the synthetic dataset is fairly low in
comparison with our previous model under the condition of medium noise injection.
Based on the fluctuations seen in the accuracy curves we can assess that this model
is not as stable as our previous two models.
(a) MNIST (b) Synthetic Dataset
Fig. 5.2.9: PPMRDPNN 3 High Noise
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This is justified since PPMRDPNN 3 has to perform several other tasks discussed in
chapter 4 unlike PPMRDPNN 1 and PPMRDPNN 2. Figure 5.2.9 shows the results
for PPMRDPNN 3 under high noise conditions. Under the high noise conditions
the accuracy drops significantly for this model. An accuracy of 93.5% and 89% is
achieved for the MNIST and synthetic dataset. In comparison to all the other tests
performed, PPMRDPNN 3 performs poorly under these conditions. When we couple
these results with the scalability analysis of PPMRDPNN 3 we see that in comparison
to the other two models, this model is outperformed. Although it does not perform
as well as the other two models, the results are still respectable under the conditions
through which it was implemented and the additional tasks that it performs. The
model performs well under the persepective of feasibility testing. Table 5.2.5 and
5.2.6 show the overall results and other model parameters.
Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 1.3 256 15 1.13 93.5%
0.25 1.0 256 45 3.01 97.3%
0.25 0.7 256 60 8.01 98.5%
Table 5.2.5: PPMRDPNN 3 MNIST Overall Results
Learning Rate Noise Multiplier Number of Microbatches Epochs Privacy ε Accuracy
0.25 7 33,360 700 1.13 89.0%
0.25 6.6 33,360 800 3.01 92.0%
0.25 5.9 33,360 900 8.01 95.6%
Table 5.2.6: PPMRDPNN 3 Synthetic Data Overall Results
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5.3 Comparative Analysis
To get a better understanding of our results, we compare them with several states of
the art privacy-preserving neural networks. The results in table 5.3.1 represent the
results obtained by other researchers, and table 5.3.2 represents the results obtained
by the execution of our privacy-preserving models. When we compare our results
Model Dataset Neural Network Depth Accuracy
Shokri et.al. [27] MNIST 11 layers 99.17%
MiniONN [20] MNIST 9 layers 97.6%
Gilad-Bachrach et. al. [7] MNIST 9 Layers 99.0%
SecureML [24] MNIST 5 Layer 93.1 %
Table 5.3.1: Results Obtained by Peer Researchers






















Table 5.3.2: Results Obtained by Proposed Methods
with the results obtained by other researchers, we see that there is not a signifi-
cant difference in the accuracy obtained. The privacy models implemented by [20],
[24], [7] are all secure cryptonets that we have discussed in chapter 3. Now, these
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secure cryptonets use encryption techniques to protect user data during the train-
ing phase. When these encryption techniques are coupled with the complex sigmoid
calculations of the neural network, the scalability of the neural networks collapses.
When we compare the accuracy of these approaches, we see that our models match
the performance of the state of the art methods under the conditions of low noise
injection. Our neural networks can achieve similar accuracies using fewer layers of
processing. We also present the scalabilities of all of our models and prove that an
optimal privacy-accuracy tradeoff can be achieved for large scale privacy-preserving
deep learning. For example, if we look at table 5.3.2 we can see that PPMRDPNN 2
with medium and high noise injection still achieves a respectable accuracy with minor
discrepancies when compared to the models proposed by [20], [24], [7], and [27]. An
additional benefit of PPMRDPNN 2 is the excellent scalability of the model for large
datasets. PPMRDPNN 1 also provides excellent results under high and medium noise
injection with good scalability. PPMRDPNN 3 achieves respectable accuracy scores
for the MNIST dataset under high and medium noise injection in comparison to the
peer models. The poor scalability aspect does not make it a viable model for large
scale datasets. When we compare our models with the performance presented by [27],
we see that Shokri et al. achieves higher accuracy. Still, the scalability of their model
is not tested against large datasets. Additionally, their model is still susceptible to
reconstruction attacks since they rely on a third party parameter server. In con-
clusion, our PPMRDPNN 1 and PPMRDPNN 2 model prove to be a viable option
for large scale privacy-preserving deep learning as they provide optimal scalability
coupled with an efficient privacy and accuracy tradeoff.
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Conclusion & Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we address the scalability and privacy issues of neural networks for large
scale privacy-preserving deep learning with the help of the MapReduce framework.
We implement the neural network architecture with the help of TensorFlow-privacy
and optimize the system using a differentially private stochastic gradient descent al-
gorithm to ensure strong privacy guarantees. In the initial chapters, we discuss the
various needs for privacy-preserving deep learning and different privacy-preserving al-
gorithms. We also discuss the utility of the neural network and also discuss methods
used in literature to scale and preserve the privacy using the neural network model.
From this, we pick up a new problem of implementing multiple neural networks in par-
allel using various data distribution techniques that utilizes an existing differentially
private algorithm to enable a way to secure user data while extracting the full benefits
of deep learning. We propose three novel models to achieve privacy-preserving deep
learning, and we evaluate and analyze the models thoroughly.
In the later sections, we do an in-depth analysis of the scalability aspects of
all three models. We test all three models under three levels of noise injections to
provide strong privacy guarantees. We then do a performance analysis of our model by
examining the effects by tweaking core parameters. We benchmark the performance
of our models with existing approaches. Finally, although the architecture of our
peers work is different, we can say that the performance of our models can match the
performance of their work in aspects such as accuracy.
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6.2 Future Work
When implementing our models, we restrict it to the MapReduce framework. In the
future, using Apache Spark would be beneficial as it provides in-memory processing
to speed up the execution process. Additionally, we use TensorFlow-privacy and
differential privacy to implement and train our neural networks. The models could
be trained on a secure and trusted hardware environment such as Intel SGX to provide
additional privacy guarantees. Furthermore, our models are most viable for multiple
data owners. There is a future scope to implement these models and make them
feasible for a broader audience.
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